I. INTRODUCTION
It is no secret that European nations have made great progress since World War II; a war that left many of them in shambles.' Shortly after the War, "[f]ew could have envisaged the way in which the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951, by the Treaty of Paris, would lead on to five decades of European institution building and European policymaking." 2 An essential policy allowing for the free movement of European workers between European countries was particularly important to this development. 3 The free movement of workers created a potentially potent labor force that would not only shape the organization of the European Community's economic structure, but also heavily affect the movement of health services among its countries. 4 Particularly, "[e]mployers and managers, in member state medical care systems, [were then] able to look beyond the boundaries of their own national labour markets and within the member states of the EU for the labour they need [ed] ." 5 Although European Union (EU) mandates supporting the free movement of workers may allow physicians the freedom to seek education and employment in other Member States, the failure of the EU to establish a strong policy or legal solution to address the potentially negative outcomes of these mandates may damage the health care workforces of some of its Member States. 6 This Note will discuss whether the EU's mutual recognition of physician qualifications and the resulting physician movement in the EU poses enough of a threat to the health care workforces of EU Member States 7 to require the EU to legally address the potentially negative outcomes. 8 Section I of this Note will analyze the development of health policy in the EU and the different mandates that have affected and continue to affect its development. The latter part of this Section will explore some of the potentially damaging effects of these policies. Section HI will discuss how Member States Spain and the United Kingdom (UK) implement EU laws allowing physicians from EU states to move freely in and out of their borders and how these laws affect their respective physician workforces. This Section will also demonstrate the effect EU laws allowing for physician movement have on the more underdeveloped countries of the EU, particularly those new Member States who acceded to the EU in 2004. 9 Section III will offer counterarguments regarding why laws allowing for potential physician movement, especially in the wake of the latest enlargement, pose no threat to the new and old Member States of the EU and why these laws may benefit the Member States of the EU. Section IV will then provide a number of legal solutions' to the problems that physician movement in the EU arguably creates.
A. The Development of Health Policy Towards Physicians in the EU
The Treaty of Rome, which a handful of western European countries signed in 1957, aimed specifically to prevent another war between European countries after the two World Wars had left the region in disarray." Afterward, the signatories of the Treaty not only dedicated themselves to peace, but also to the free movement of goods and services.' 2 Specifically, the "governments that signed the Treaty of Rome in 1957 committed themselves to the mutual recognition of qualifications, as it is of little use to professionals to be able to move if they [could not] work when they arrive[d in other Member States]."' 3 To facilitate this policy, the European Union has implemented different means to simplify licensing requirements.
14 The EU "gives every European Union citizen a fundamental, personal right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States. No visas or work permits are required."' 15 Although the signatories of the Treaty of Rome placed a great emphasis on the free movement of goods and services, the signers failed to make any significant commitment to public health. 16 European countries referred to public health as merely a justification to block the movement of goods when such movement potentially threatened a given aspect of public health in one of the Member States. 17 At this time the "competence [of the EU] in the broader area of health was considered by most commentators to be extremely limited." 18 Despite the EU's non-interventionist approach to its health policy in its treaties, the European Commission (EC) issued two Directives in 1975, known as the "Doctors Directives," to facilitate the free movement of physicians between the Member States. 19 The Directives primarily addressed the mutual recognition of qualifications for physicians who were licensed in one country, but sought to practice in another. 20 EU lawmakers supplemented these Directives in 1986 with other directives addressing the training of physicians.
2 ' After the EC issued these directives, the EU showed more, but still 22 passive, willingness to intervene into the health affairs of its Member States. In 1992, the EU affirmatively stated its health policy objectives in a provision of the Maastricht Treaty. 23 This provision, Article 129, held a "mandate of 'encouraging cooperation between member states' and 'if necessary, lending support to their actions' in public health. 24 Article 129 also gave the EU the power "to spend money on European level health projects but [it was] forbidden to pass law [s] harmonising public health measures in the member states. 25 EU lawmakers enhanced these provisions and the health policy power of the EU, under the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997.26 Under Article 152 of this treaty, "the EU was commanded to ensure 'a high level of human health protection' in the 'definition and implementation of all policies and activities' and to work with member states to improve public health, prevent illness [,] and 'obviate sources of danger to human health.' ' 27 However, subsections four and five of the Article diluted the strength of the mandate, requiring the EU to "fully respect the responsibilities of the Member States for the organisation and delivery of health services and medical care., 28 Although these treaties lacked the strength to coerce countries to adopt certain measures, these treaties have set a general basis for the development of a health policy in the EU.
In the last decade, the Court of Justice of the European Communities (ECJ) has also played a role in the development of health policy in the EU. 29 The court has recently made specific rulings facilitating the development of an EU policy toward the free movement of workers as well as the free movement of health services. 30 32 were of significant importance to this development. 33 Two other cases, decided in 2001, substantiated the principles set forth in 1998 and revealed the Court's belief that some regulation of health care in the EU should occur through the 23 [Vol. 18:2 EU itself. 34 The EU has shown a passive approach to the regulation of health care; however, it has also encouraged the free movement of health professionals and services among its member states. A deeper look at some EU mandates reveals this emphasis and its weaknesses.
B. EU Mandates Affecting Physician Movement in the EU

Treaties
One must understand the legal system of the EU to a certain degree to appreciate the effect different legal mandates may have on physician movement. EU lawmaking authority is primarily formed by a series of treaties. 35 "Once ratified, the Treaties determine the competence at EU level and what remains the responsibility of Member States., 36 The treaties tend to speak in generalities and require some interpretation, which the European Commission 3 1 offers through legislation it proposes to the Council of Ministers 38 and the European Parliament. 39 Both of these bodies must generally approve legislation. 4° In the event of a dispute, reconciliation measures exist to address the differences. 4 ' EU treaties have shaped EU health policy in a weak fashion over the last two decades. 42 The Treaty of Maastricht was the first time the EU indicated it was willing to intervene in the health policies of its Member States in a treaty. 43 "Article 129 [of the Treaty] made provision for community action to prevent diseases, in particular major health scourges." 44 Moreover, the Article "provided the basis for a programme of action in health promotion, information, education and training in public health. 45 Although the Article took a broad approach to a narrow health issue (major health scourges) confronting the EU, "it specified that health protection should form a part of the Community's other policies . The reception by the Member States of the new Article was lukewarm at best. 48 There was "concern about the ambiguous position of health services;
with some arguing that policies to promote health that ignore the contribution of health services are untenable." 49 Yet, it was progress, considering "health care [traditionally] was an area into which many governments did not wish to stray, for various reasons. 5°W hile the EU revisited its health policy position in the Treaty of Amsterdam, 5 ' the relevant Article in this treaty, Article 152, suffered from some of the same limitations as Article 129.52 Article 152 "was inserted at the last moment, with minimal consultation, and as yet another compromise, it is in places confusing and almost self-contradictory, in marked contrast to, for example, articles on consumer protection or the environment., 53 Despite the apparent drawbacks of Article 152, "it is stated that Community action shall be directed towards improving public health, although what is meant by public health remains unclear.
4
These treaties created many uncertainties regarding the EU's health policy. 55 The result of this uncertainty is a lack of much needed initiative to support or interfere in the health care systems of the Member States when it may be appropriate, such as when EU enlargement and potential physician migration may threaten other Member States. 56
Courts
The ECJ will resolve any questions or disputes EU legislation may create. 57 The ECJ has three main purposes:
to judge in disputes brought by the Commission or the Member States against the Member States concerning questions about the legality of action and non-compliance; judicial review of the actions and the failure to act by the 47 The Court had a limited role until 1963, when it developed three doctrines possibly defining its scope and power.
5 9 First, after the "Court decided that individuals had the right to invoke European Community law [,] .. . the principle of 'direct effect"' developed through which the Court could hold Member States liable for failing to implement treaty provisions into their national laws. 6° Second, "the Court developed the doctrine of 'state liability' ,,61 whereby the state can be held liable for infringements of Directives.
Third, the Court may operate under the "supremacy doctrine," which allows the Court to apply European law when a conflict exists between the laws of two Member
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States. The last doctrine gives the Court the authority to act against states who have not complied with different EU mandates. 63 In the absence of a strong health policy in EU treaties, the ECJ has recently become the legal entity to shape it. 64 The decisions by the Court in Decker 6 5 and Kohl166 demonstrated the willingness of the Court to address health-related disputes and remedy some of the vagaries of the EU's health policy. 67 Both cases involved citizens of Luxembourg who received care outside of their country and in another Member State. Mr. Decker, who obtained spectacles, and Mr. Kohll who received orthodontic treatment, both prevailed in their arguments asserting the Luxembourg health insurance plan was accountable to reimburse them for their expenditures "even though it had not authorised their treatment abroad., 69 In these rulings, the Court established two important principles: 1) "the mutual recognition of qualifications precludes health authorities from arguing that care provided in one country is of lower quality than in another; ' 70 and, although less clear, 2) "some saw [these cases] as establishing an important precedentthat health care should be subject to European laws on the free movement of The ECJ addressed these cases after the defendant health insurance fund refused to reimburse the plaintiffs on the ground their situations did not require treatment from abroad or from an institution with which it had not contracted. 74 The Court ruled "that member states had the right to organise their health care systems as they chose, although they must comply with relevant European law. 75 Furthermore, "for the first time, and in the face of forceful arguments to the contrary, the court held that medical care provided in hospitals was subject to European law on free movement of services, regardless of how it is paid for." 7 6 The Court went so far as to add "demanding prior authorisation was an obstacle to free movement of patients but that this could, in certain circumstances, be justified. 7 7 This decision, coupled with the 1998 decisions of the ECJ, showed the ECJ was willing to shape an EU health policy; when different EU treaties have reserved authority over these areas to the Member States themselves, these rulings afforded greater authority to the EU to regulate the health policies of its 
Legislation
Although EU treaties and ECJ decisions have helped shape EU health policy, the different Directives the EU has passed have facilitated the unrestrained flow of physicians through the different Member States. 79 The EU has the capacity to pass legislation governing the Member States; some of it effectively "takes priority over national legislation... ,, 80 European legislation may take many forms including Regulations, Directives, Decisions, Recommendations, and Opinions. 8 ' "Regulations are specific measures that have immediate and direct force of law without adaptation to national circumstances, common in areas such as external trade." 8 2 The EU most commonly uses Directives as legislative mechanisms "setting out the goals to be achieved but leaving it to each Member State to determine how to achieve them." 83 Once the EU passes a Directive, the Member States must incorporate the Directive into their national laws within a given time period.8 Decisions are also legally binding, but usually do not have a general effect, and Recommendations and Opinions have no legally binding effect whatsoever. legal." Under the Transitional Directives, European countries focused on "the recognition of professional experience rather than mutual recognition of diplomas., 87 [e]ach Member State shall recognise evidence of formal qualifications as doctor giving access to the professional activities of doctor with basic training and specialised doctor.
• . listed in Annex V, points 5.1.1, 5.1.2, . . . respectively, which satisfy the minimum training conditions referred to in Articles 24, 25, .. . respectively, and shall, for the purposes of access to and pursuit of the professional activities, give such evidence the same effect on its territory as the evidence of formal qualifications which it itself issues.°4 Annex V lays out the different formal qualifications (diplomas) each host state should recognize from the physician's home state.
1 0 5 Articles 24 through 30 explain the specific minimal criteria general medicine and specialist physicians must meet. 16 The efforts of the EU Parliament to consolidate these Directives to establish a uniform health care principle, the mutual recognition of qualifications, throughout its various states indicates the EU Parliament is increasingly trying to improve the delivery of health care in the EU.
What is clear from the EU's approach to its health policy is that there is no clear policy or mandate to the Member States.' 0 7 EU treaties have been reluctant to regulate the health systems of the Member States as a whole.1 0 8
While the ECJ has more recently pushed for greater regulation from the EU, it can only act insomuch as the cases it receives allow it. EU legislation has paved the way for health care professionals to move between the Member States; however, it has failed to go beyond that point and regulate against the potentially adverse effects these mandates may have on the health care systems of its Member States.
C. The Feared Effect
Although the EU has championed the free movement of its workers, including physicians, its mandates may pose serious threats to the health care workforces of some of its Member States.1 9 The Directives would allow for what some have called "physician migration," where, under systems of mutual recognition and diplomas, physicians may move from one country and receive education or practice medicine in another country. 110 One scholar appropriately captured the problem, noting:
the ongoing process of integration of EU countries and the removal of many barriers to professional mobility pose a direct challenge to the maintenance of an equitable workforce because of the real potential to deprive some regions and countries of key staff that can be attracted elsewhere by better paid jobs and enhanced working conditions."' Physicians may choose to 1ractice in other countries for various economic and professional reasons.
11 2 The economic incentives and the hope of a better lifestyle lure some physicians to practice in other countries where these goals can be realized. 1 3 Also, physicians may choose to move abroad because their home countries do not provide the high level of training or research opportunities they seek.1 14 The prospect of unemployment in the home country of a physician may also drive him or her to seek employment in another country.' 1 5 Furthermore, physicians may choose to return to practice abroad after returning home from their educational hiatus because another country has trained them to perform certain procedures the home country does not need or 225, 245-46 (2000) . In this article, one Ugandan doctor characterized the sober reality of this proposition in her comments indicating she "was seeking employment locally because she felt that the UK offered her children a better life." Id.
113 because the work they find themselves doing is "unstimulating." 1 6 Physician migration affects the home country and the host country in very different ways." 7 The effect of physician migration on host countries is usually more beneficial than the effect on the home country." 8 An increased supply of physicians in one country resulting from hosting foreign physicians may benefit its consumers, allowing greater access to physicians and potentially lower costs." 9 This is particularly important in countries which heavily rely on foreign physicians, such as the United Kingdom, to meet health services demands. 12 Furthermore, "[i]ncreased competition between physicians may raise the quality of health care provided in the host country."'
Despite the benefits physician migration may provide host countries, the home countries of the physicians pay the heaviest price. 1 22 Some have referred to the flight of physicians to foreign countries as a depletion of human capital which results in "brain drain. 123 The effect of brain drain includes "deterioration in the working conditions of remaining physicians. Moreover, it may affect access to and quality of care, and impair the ability of the health care system to achieve health objectives for its population.' 24 Brain drain "may also influence the capacity of the home country to provide quality training to new physicians and the research capacity of medical schools.' 2 5 Moreover, home countries will suffer economic losses where they pay to educate citizens who leave after graduation to work in another country. 126 The broader implications of brain drain include that it occurs generally in poor countries 
See id.
119. Nicholas, supra note 3, at 92. 120. Mullan, supra note 79, at 1816. In this article, the author highlighted the UK's reliance on foreign physicians, alluding to the United Kingdom's policy in a recent year, "to achiev[e] a rapid increase of 9500 physicians by a combination of new medical schools and increased recruitment abroad." Id. The driving forces of this policy are evident when:
between 1985 and 1994, the 27 countries that make up Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) increased the output from their medical schools by an average of 26%. (cite omitted). However, in the UK, USA, and Canada the increase was only 14%, 10%, and 18%, respectively, the shortfall being made up by physicians trained overseas. In the UK, many of the foreign doctors who now work in the National Health Service, initially came from higher level training in specialist subjects.
Bundred & Levitt, supra note 112, at 245. 121. Forcier et al., supra note 6.
122. Mullan, supra note 79, at 1816. The article articulates this effect clearly by stating, "[a]lthough there are undoubtedly benefits that accrue to source countries whose physicians move to high-income English-speaking nations, there can be little question that the emigration of these physicians is also a loss to the health systems of the source countries." Id. 
2008]
already facing physician shortages of their own. 1 27 The resulting "inadequacy and instability of the physician workforce in many lower-income countries are major impediments to disease-reduction initiatives sponsored by the Global Fund, the WHO, the World Bank, the U.S. government, and many others.'
128
As long as the EU fails to regulate the movement of its physicians, the physicians will most likely exercise their ability to move between the Member States at their discretion. The effect of physician migration will thus go untamed, potentially hampering the ability of developing countries of the EU to establish adequate health care delivery to their citizens, which could ultimately present a public health problem for the EU. 29 Regardless, it is still questioned whether the free movement of physicians in the EU threatens the health care systems of its Member States to the extent EU intervention and regulation is required.
1I. ANALYSIS
Although there has been much discussion of the potential effect physician migration may have on developing EU countries, its actual effect remains unclear. 30 The second part of this Note will analyze the health care systems of two EU countries, England and Spain, and the manner in which these countries have implemented the EU Directives facilitating the free movement of physicians in and out of their countries. Ultimately, this portion of the Note will discuss the actual effect of the Directives on those countries and other EU countries, specifically those countries which have recently acceded to the EU.
A. The United Kingdom
The National Health Service
Whenever scholars discuss the topic of physician migration in the European context, the United Kingdom (UK) is a central focus of the debate because the UK continually suffers from physician shortages and has a great need for foreign physicians. 131 The NHS "covers everything from antenatal screening and routine treatments for coughs and colds to open heart surgery, The OECD brings together the governments of countries committed to democracy and the market economy from around the world to:
was struggling to keep up with these countries as well. 145 In 2003, life expectancy was 79 years, just above the OECD average, but still lower than France, Italy, and Spain, among others. 46 Furthermore, although the UK's infant mortality rate has declined over the past decades and currently stands at 5.1 deaths per 1,000 citizens, its rate still lags behind most other European countries. 47 In light of these outcomes, " [t] here is evidence to suggest that higher densities of physicians tend to be associated with better health outcomes and responsiveness across countries .... ,,148 Specifically, other academic work "has suggested that the number of physicians per capita is inversely associated with avoidable mortality.
,,49 Although the health care system of the UK may appear to have sound infrastructure and adequate capitalization, its shortage of physicians may greatly contribute to its deficient health care indicators. 
The UK's Implementation of EU Mandates
In the UK, the General Medical Council (GMC) governs and oversees the recognition of the professional qualifications of domestic and foreign physicians.' 5 ' The Medical Act of 1858152 established the GMC, which is Finally, Section 15A of the Act allows the GMC to provisionally register foreign physicians so foreign physicians may eventually achieve primary European qualification.' 63 Under this Section, the GMC gives those who it has determined have adequate training' 64 or level of education, meaning a medical degree meeting the standards set forth in Directive 2005/36,'65 the opportunity to attain the appropriate amount of clinical experience likely needed to meet the standard of primary European qualification the Act requires.' 66 The Medical Act demonstrates how an EU country may implement a legislative scheme that an EU directive would propose. In this case, it allows for the free movement of physicians from other countries in the EU to potentially practice in the UK through the GMC' s mutual recognition of their qualifications.
The Directives encouraging the mutual recognition of physician qualifications may not have posed any apparent problems when the EU initially implemented them in 1975; however, when ten new countries were set to enter the EU in 2004, and subject themselves to the EU laws allowing for the free movement of physicians, the UK became concerned with a potentially great influx of foreign physicians. 167 Nevertheless, an influx of physicians would invariably help the UK relieve its physician shortages. At the same time, it could end up costing other countries valuable medical human resources.168
The Effect of Physician Movement on the United Kingdom
The UK suffers from a shortage of physicians. 169 However, EU laws allowing for the free movement of physicians, which the UK has adopted through the Medical Act of 1983 that implements the provisions of Directives 93/16 and 2005/36, allow the UK to draw from the physician supplies of other countries. Statistics are particularly revealing of physician shortages in the UK. 170 As mentioned above, the UK has 2.3 practicing physicians per 1000 persons, which, although it is up from 1998 when it only supplied 1.9 physicians per 1000 persons, still lags behind the OECD average of 3.0 physicians per 1000 persons. 171 The 1. Entry to medical schools has been increased by 30% by creating new medical schools and increasing entries to existing schools. 2. Changes in skill mix. Nurses are being trained to take over doctors' roles and a new grade of "consultant nurse" is being developed in English hospitals. Outside hospitals, nurses are being trained to dispense pharmaceuticals. While such skill mix changes may compensate for shortages of doctors, they might increase nurse shortages. 3. Incentive systems to enhance recruitment and retention have been put in place. 4. International recruitment. Considerable efforts have been put into recruiting more doctors from overseas. The United Kingdom has traditionally recruited doctors from the Indian subcontinent and the Middle East and over 25% of the existing doctor stock has been trained overseas. The new recruitment drive has focused on countries with a surplus, such as Spain, but despite attempts to avoid recruitment from developing countries, it has also attracted many doctors from countries such as South Africa. A Code of Practice on international recruitment has now been enacted, although the private sector is not bound by it. These policies have facilitated an increase in the number of physicians. However, their effectiveness has been reduced by other developments. The EU Working Time Directive and NHS reforms creating a "consultant-led service" have reduced the number of hours worked, making supply deficiencies more evident. In addition, scandals related to medical practice, which have had wide circulation in the national media, appear to have encouraged much greater caution by practitioners, leading to slower processes of care.
Id.
176. NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE, supra note 175, at 55. In light of the recruitment efforts of the NHS, it has also adopted an ethical code in its recruiting, pledging to abstain from [Vol. 18:2 UK to promote employment in the NHS to other countries to sustain the proposed staff expansion growth of the NHS. 77 While these efforts may relieve the UK of its physician shortages, these efforts may come at the expense of exploiting the physician supplies of other countries and, ultimately, their public health predicaments. 78 Although the UK may draw physicians from other EU countries, statistics show the UK does not necessarily draw a high percentage of physicians from these countries. 1 79 In 2001, 37.3% of the UK's physician workforce consisted of foreign physicians.' 80 However, upon close examination, one would find the majority of the physicians who make up this 37.3% of foreign physicians in the UK are not from EU countries: 18.3% are from India; 15.2% are from Ireland; 7% are from South Africa; and 12.3% are from other parts of Africa. 8! In comparison, 4.0% of the physicians composing the 37% of foreign physicians in the UK are from Germany, 2.6% are from Spain, and 1.6% are from Poland. 82 Despite the efforts by the UK to remedy its shortages through relying on a low percentage of physicians trained in other EU countries, this percentage still represented 5,212 doctors from other EU countries -5,212 doctors some underdeveloped countries of the EU probably valued very highly.
83
EU laws facilitate the free movement of physicians between EU countries; the UK greatly benefits as a result. The UK has implemented the fundamental principles of Directive 2005/36 into its laws to ensure the recognition of the qualifications of EU physicians as long as the EU physicians meet certain requirements ultimately set out in the Directive.' 8 4 As a result, the UK may take advantage of other physician pools in EU countries to relieve its shortages. While it does not primarily target EU physicians in its recruitment efforts it still recruits physicians from the EU, and it recruits them from less developed countries.' 5 Across the English Channel, Spain faces an entirely different situation than the problem of physician shortages confronting the UK. 
B. Spain 1. Sistema Nacional de Salud
The health care problems of Spain are completely opposite of those in the UK; Spain suffers from physician surpluses, and it is very difficult for domestic and foreign physicians to practice medicine in Spain.' 86 Furthermore, it does not appear Spain has implemented Directive 2005/36; therefore, the system of recognizing the qualifications of physicians in Spain abides by the standards set forth in Directive 93/16.187 Although the EU's system may not relieve Spain's surpluses, its participation in the EU allows the doctors trained in Spain to move abroad, thereby relieving Spain from its physician surplus.
The health care system in Spain is called el Sistema Nacional de Salud (SNS), or in English, the "National Health System."' 88 The Ley General de Sanidad de 1986 ("National Health Act of 1986" (NHA)) established the SNS as it fundamentally exists today. The NHA established the SNS hoping the SNS would achieve "universal coverage.., and foster decentralization. At the local level, health care providers deliver their services through two main centers.
9 5 The first is Atencion Primaria (Primary Care), where health care providers locally administer services in Centros de Salud (Health Centers).
196 Health Center providers seek to offer Spanish citizens a basic level of care and aim to situate themselves fifteen minutes from each Spanish citizen's residence. 97 Health Centers employ family physicians, pediatricians, nurses, and spaces for social workers and physical therapists.'
8 The second set of centers through which health care providers deliver services are Centros de Especialdades y Hospitales (Specialist and Hospital Centers), where physicians render specialty outpatient and inpatient care.1
99
The SNS funds health care services through a mix of two sources: taxes and each Autonomous Community's budget.
2 00 Generally, taxes constitute 90% of the funding and social security supplies the remaining 10%.
2 0 1 SNS primarily pays Spanish physicians in the form of salaries the government formulates by taking into account the number of years SNS has employed a 202 physician and if a physician has continually served in a full-time capacity.
Whether Spain finds its health care desirable or not, the SNS is imploded with physicians. 2°3 In the early 1990's, the amount of practicing physicians doubled; consequently, it provided 4.8 physicians per 1,000 inhabitants, more than twice the number of physicians per 1,000 inhabitants in the UK in the early 1990's 204 Although these surpluses may have benefited the SNS, great unemployment existed among doctors in Spain in the late 1980's, exposing the beginnings of continuing physician surpluses. 20 5 Despite high levels of physician unemployment, the SNS has performed well compared to other OECD countries. 2° It spent a total of 8.1% of its GDP on health care, which is slightly below the OECD average of 8.9%. 207 It also spent less per capita for health care than the OECD average, with expenditures in 2004 of $2,100, compared to the average OECD country expenditure of $2,550.208 Despite indications of low spending on health care in Spain, it has steadily increased its health expenditures "by 5.6% per year on average" and boasts "more physicians per capita than... most other OECD countries." 2°9 Spain's health indicators also demonstrate its apparent success: "In 2004, life expectancy at birth in Spain stood at 80.5 years, more than two years higher than the OECD average (78.3 years). Only Japan, Switzerland, Sweden and Australia registered a higher life expectancy than Spain in 2004.,,2I' Also, the infant mortality rate in Spain was significantly less than the OECD average of 3.5 deaths per 1,000 live births in 2004 and an average of 5.7 deaths per 1000 births on average across OECD countries.
211 Thus, the SNS spends less than the average OECD country on its health care, but Spain's indicators show its citizens do not suffer as a result. there will come a point when you become extremely disoriented by the whole process. Senior males will suffer most, whereas women will more quickly recognize that 'glass ceiling' feeling, when nobody blatantly turns around and says 'forget it' but a distinct lack or progress is being made. However, Spain is not Germany, and the less assiduous, "So what are you going to do about it?" attitude to the application of EU norms, combined with a massive historical problem of medical unemployment, means that foreigners must expect obstacles.
Spain's Implementation of EU Law
223
Despite the tedious process foreign physicians must endure for Spain to recognize their qualifications, Spain greatly benefits from EU laws allowing for the mutual recognition of qualifications because it allows the surpluses of physicians it trains to move to other EU countries and practice with relative ease.
The Effect of EU laws on Physician Movement in Spain
Spain's relationship with the UK may highlight the manner in which Spain benefits from EU laws allowing for the mutual recognition of physician qualifications. In 2000, a representative from the NHS visited Spain as part of the NHS' recruiting process to, in this instance, recruit more nurses. 2 4 However, "[t]he agreement also opened the door to recruit Spanish doctors... Spain is a fertile area for the recruitment of doctors because it has a surplus [of physicians]. 225 This is particularly beneficial to Spain which, at the time of these agreements, "showed that 22% of Spanish doctors were either unemployed or... without job security because the country had more doctors than it needed." Spanish physicians encourage the open recruiting in which the UK engages. 226 One physician noted he "welcomed the NHS move to recruit Spanish doctors, thinking that this might actually [be] ... a solution for those doctors who were currently unemployed or working in insecure conditions., 227 EU laws help solve the problems of physician supply faced by both the UK and Spain. In the UK, EU laws permit it to actively recruit abroad because laws allowing for the mutual recognition of qualifications make the transition of 228 a foreign physician less problematic.
EU laws allowing for the free 7322 (2001) , available at http://www.bmj.concgi/content/full/3237322/1150/a. The article notes that since both countries signed the agreement they made during this visit, the NHS has recruited 400 nurses from Spain. Id.
225. Id. See also Lopez-Valcarcel & Davila Quintana, supra note 186, at 118 (indicating the migratory flow has changed and Spanish specialists are now emigrating to nearby countries such as Portugal. In 2000, an agreement facilitating employment was signed between Spain and the United Kingdom. In the United Kingdom, salaries are more than double those in Spain, but the exact extent of migration from Spain is unknown).
226. Bosch, supra note 221. 227. Id. 228. The levels of difficulty a physician may encounter in having another country recognize his/her qualifications will also depend heavily on the level of the physician's training in his/her home state. The process may be complicated if they have to pursue more training or have to [Vol. 18:2 movement of physicians among EU countries permit Spanish doctors, who are not in high demand in Spain, to move abroad and find employment in countries, such as the UK, where their services are needed. 229 In the UK, Spanish doctors can "expect 'either to get a permanent job.. . or to come back to Spain with a chance of getting a non-precarious post.
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C. The Effect of EU Law on the Underdeveloped Countries of the EU
Despite the advantages EU laws grant countries such as the UK and Spain, some EU countries would argue these laws were not advantageous to the maintenance of their physician supplies. 23 ' This attitude recently surfaced while the EU anticipated the addition of ten new countries to its structure in 2004.232 Many deemed this occurrence as "one of the most significant events in the economic and political life of the European continent. ' 233 The enlargement added "almost 75 million persons to a community already comprising 380 millions (an increase of 19.5%).,,234 Despite the significance of the event, and its potential positive implications, it provoked concerns that, given the EU's laws allowing for the free movement workers, workers from the acceding countries would emigrate "en masse.' '235 It was believed such migration would "create pressure in the already dysfunctional markets and would potentially cause further unemployment and lower wages, among other harmful results. 236 The health situations of the acceding countries also varied substantially from those of the previous fifteen Member States, which created further apprehension. 2 
238.
Id. Particularly, in 2001, the EU life expectancy average for males was about 75 years while the Czech Republic rate's measured about 72 years, Slovenia's rate about 71 years, Poland's rate about 70 years, Hungary's rate about 68 years, Romania's rate about 67 years, Lithuania's rate about 66 years, Estonia's rate about 65 years, and Latvia's rate about 64 years. Id. at 25.
future. ' 239 One study found "in 1988, about 25% of the mortality gap between east and west Europe between birth and age 75 could have been explained by medical care." 240 While many underdeveloped nations of the EU's health care indicators were lacking, many of their youngest and most well educated population desired to move abroad. 2 4 ' "The potential youth drain is combined with a potential 'brain drain.' The sending countries are in danger of losing between 3% and 5% of people who have third-level education, and more than 10% of their students., 242 Of these, 2-3% of graduate students have a firm intent to move abroad after graduation. 243 These youngest and brightest students include physicians. One of these countries, Lithuania, indicated a third of its doctors would go abroad to other EU states when it joined the EU in 2004.245 Speaking on a broader scale, Lithuania's health ministry, through is own research, found "61% of doctors in training and 27% of practicing doctors said they wanted to work abroad once the Baltic ... join[ed] the European Union [and] . . . of those, 15% of doctors in training and 5% of practicing doctorsfirmly intend[ed] not to return. '' 46 In Croatia, 247 204 medical students in their last year at the University of Zagreb's Medical School were surveyed, 248 and the survey found "[e]ighty four students were considering immigrating, mostly to the EU (57 respondents), especially [those from] Slovenia." 249 These results revealed a 10% increase from the previous year of new graduates who would emigrate abroad. 5 0 239. Id. at 24. 240. Id. at 37. Other factors also indicate the struggling nature of the majority of the health systems of the acceding countries; the acceding countries have high rates of death attributable to cardiovascular disease and alcohol and more than 20 % of their women suffering from some long-term chronic illness, with a greater number of males suffering from the same category of ailment. Among those who indicated they were the most likely to leave were those at the top of their class; Croatia's best and brightest. 25 Furthermore, like Lithuania, the group mostly likely to migrate "would be the youngest and best qualified nurses and doctors. 257 Recent moves made by physicians to take advantage of opportunities to migrate to other countries with which Poland has existing agreements highlight the negative implications of Poland's accession, and the effective threat current EU laws allowing for the mutual recognition of qualifications may pose to its health care system. 258 Thus, EU laws allowing for the mutual recognition of qualifications, and facilitating physician migration, stand to adversely affect Poland. 259 An independent commission, The Permanent Working Group of European Junior Doctors, confirmed the desires of soon-to-graduate physicians from those countries who entered the EU in 2004 to move to other EU states to practice once the physicians entered the EU. 26 
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much higher pay but also better training opportunities and working conditions., 261 The President of the organization also noted the physicians from these states mostly wanted to emigrate to the UK. 262 Therefore, while EU laws allowing the free movement of physicians benefit some of the most developed nations in the EU, such as Spain and the UK, EU laws allowing the free movement of physicians are depriving many of its developing nations of valuable health care resources-their personnel-which ultimately decreases the level of health care the citizens of those countries may receive. 263 
III. COUNTERARGUMENTS
Although some countries may bear the burden of EU laws allowing their physicians to move abroad to practice medicine, the effect any physician migration may have on these states-mostly new Member States-may be insignificant; further, the various benefits laws allowing for the free movement of physicians bring may outweigh their costs. 264 One of the foremost arguments to fears of physician flight and brain drain has been that as the newer Member States transition into the EU community, regardless of EU laws such as Directives 96/13 and 2005/36, immigration levels will be modest. 265 A group of EU research institutes confirmed the level of immigration's "overall impact on the European labour market should be limited.", 266 Other reports have noted migration will not initially overwhelm the Member States, but it will occur 267 gradually over time.
And, even as immigration occurs over time, the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions concluded a maximum of only 4.5 percent of the population in the new Member States may emigrate in the next five years.
268
Past EU enlargement also helps to prove the expectation of large-scale emigration and its consequences is unfounded.
2 69 One group of authors noted similar fears of migration accompanied these expansions, 270 [Vol. 18:2 migration flow from these countries never materialized., 27 ' To the contrary, this group of authors argued EU enlargement deters the citizens of new Member States from immigrating:
the EU experience has confirmed that countries with belowaverage GDP and a negative migration balance actually diminish and even invert their level of migration after their integration in the economic community. This happens because the new members benefit from big flows of investment from the richer members and from higher international trade, which generate growth and employment. The positive economic performance and the ensuing improvement in living standards attract migrants back to their home countries. In fact, the higher the level of integration of the economies, the lower the level of migration pressures. For this reason, it has been argued that the close level of integration of their members has actually deterred intra-EU migration flows. 272 Furthermore, "labour mobility has ranked as the least used freedom in the Union. 27 3 Among the majority of existing Member States, "the level of intra-EU mobility has remained modest, never surpassing 50% of the total foreign population," and for six of the Member States, it has never risen above 25%.274
Not only does EU experience with past EU enlargement downplay its potential adverse consequences, but other natural barriers may constrain foreign physicians from emigrating to other Member States. 275 There are language barriers; although foreign physicians may desire to practice abroad, the inability of foreign physicians to speak the language of the country in which they may desire to practice greatly limits those desires. 276 Furthermore, foreign physicians may have to bear costs, including language differences, in adapting not only to a foreign culture, but to a foreign medical culture. 277 The "strong social and cultural ties" of a foreign physician with his/her country may initially discourage him or her from migrating as well. 278 Moreover, the prospect of receiving a reduced wage or receiving a position for which the physician is overqualified may also deter a foreign physician from migrating. 279 Also, proposals for regional solutions may not be necessary as some countries have already implemented their own codes for ethical recruiting. 83 Recognizing the foreign recruiting practices of the UK may adversely affect those countries with lower physician supplies, it "issued a Code of International Recruitment... which requires that NHS employers do not recruit actively from developing countries, unless there is a bilateral agreement. ' , 284 Additionally, the free movement of physicians, which EU laws afford, may potentially benefit the old and new EU Member States. 285 Countries that stand to lose their physicians may improve their health care systems and potentially offer greater benefits and incentives to keep their physicians. 286 Migration, coupled with the mutual recognition of qualifications, would also allow physicians from less developed countries in the EU to develop an expertise abroad, then return to contribute that newfound ability to the health care systems of their home country. 287 Moreover, EU laws allowing for the mutual recognition of qualifications would benefit the EU as a whole. Mutual recognition of qualifications would allow countries suffering from physician surpluses and high unemployment to aid other EU countries suffering from labor and physician shortages. 288 States post higher unemployment levels than the average unemployment rates of those Member States existing before accession. 29° EU laws allowing for the recognition of the qualifications of physicians in other EU countries would permit unemployed physicians to seek employment in other EU Member States starving for medical human capital. 29 ' The chief of the International Migration Programme summarized the net benefits of migration and the benefits thereof as follows:
[t]he accession of the new members will improve their situation enormously and give a new stimulus to stagnant markets in Western Europe. Some migration will undeniably appear, particularly in the neighbouring countries in the EU-15 in the short-term. However in the long run, anticipated intra-EU migration will probably continue at limited levels, even after the restrictions are lifted. 292 Thus, arguments exist asserting critics of physician movement are greatly overstating feared migration levels and EU laws allowing for the mutual recognition of physician qualifications, and the migration they encourage, actually benefit the health care systems of the EU Member States and the EU as a whole. 293 
IV. SOLUTIONS
Whether EU laws are the cause of physician supply disparities in different countries or whether apparent large amounts of migration will actually occur is unclear. However, the looming concern of their effect, particularly on the recently acceded EU countries, has generated different approaches to remedying the problem. 294 The Code also seeks "to discourage the targeted recruitment of health workers from countries which are themselves experiencing shortages . .. [and to] safeguard the rights of recruits, and conditions relating to their profession in recruiting countries. ''29 The Code focuses on principles of transparency, fairness, mutuality of benefits, compensation, selection procedures, registration, and workforce planning to achieve its objectives. 3 00 Regarding transparency, the Code explains transparency should exist in "any activities to recruit health care workers from one country to another," which may involve home and host states forming agreements between the two.
30 1 Moreover, recruiters should be honest in their recruiting efforts "about the type of skills, expertise, the number of recruits, and grades being sought." 30 2 To ensure fairness in the recruiting process, recruiting countries should not seek to recruit those individuals who have obligations to their home 303 countries. In many cases, home states providing the funding for the training of a physician require him or her to stay and practice for a designated amount of time; other countries should be respectful of these agreements. 3 0 4 One author argued host countries should honor contracts physicians have with their home individual and equal rights for all; the importance of eradicating poverty, ignorance and disease; and it opposes all forms of racial discrimination. [Vol. 18:2 state and should not be allowed to advertise "'in developing countries unless that country has specifically invited the [host country] to undertake a recruitment programme'-that recruitment 'should only be undertaken as part of an inter-governmental cooperation agreement... encouraging the exchange of healthcare personnel, healthcare information, and guidelines." 3 0 5
Recruiters should also "provide full and accurate information to potential recruits concerning: [1] the nature and requirements of the job that recruits are expected to perform; 12] countries to which they are being recruited; [3] administrative and contractual requirements; and [4] their rights.,, 3 0 6 Recruits should also have access to all information about the selection process; recruiters should assure recruits they will have the same opportunities and safeguards as other physicians practicing in the host state.
The Code also desires that both countries, the home and host country, benefit through the recruitment process. Where the migration of physicians greatly affects a home country, the host country should find ways to assist the home country. 3 0 8 Host countries may wish to compensate home countries "through the transfer of technology, skills and technical and financial assistance to the country concerned.,, 3 0 9 Alternately, host countries could provide "training programmes to enable those who return to do so with enriched value" and could "arrange[] to facilitate the return of recruitees." 31 0
Host countries should also ensure recruits understand their recruiting contracts and are willing to abide by them. 31 ' Additionally, host countries should inform potential recruits of the licensing requirements of the host country and take steps to ensure recruits have fully complied with all necessary educational training requirements or ensure the training deficiencies of the recruits are clearly conveyed to them. 312 Lastly, the Code encourages Commonwealth countries to reform domestic and training programs so Commonwealth countries will have to do less recruiting abroad. 31 3 Those countries with physician shortages could accomplish this by allowing more students to attend medical school, 3 14 or as the departure of their physicians through compulsory service. Home countries may consider allowing their publicly paid physicians to supplement their public practices with private practices to pursue an additional specialty or interest for which the public health system may not provide an opportunity. 32 Additionally, home countries could provide better pensions, child care, educational opportunities, and better educational environments in which the children of physicians would have greater opportunities. 3 28 Other efforts home countries could make to improve the retention of the physicians they train include improving medical infrastructure 329 and making more bilateral agreements with countries seeking to recruit their physicians. 330 The latter may mandate that host countries train recruits from the home country primarily in methods of care that would benefit the home country.
33
' Lastly, home countries may require recruiting countries to reimburse home countries for costs of training provided to a physician who seeks to migrate.
332
All of these solutions may work toward allowing home countries to salvage their physician resources. Particularly where sovereign nations may bargain with recruiting countries to provide some mutual benefit, sovereign nations should do so because regional non-binding agreements, such as the Code, provide no binding effect to protect countries that can ill-afford to lose their physicians.
This Note proposes the EU take initial legislative action to implement some of the suggestions the Code mentions. The Code could serve as a basis over which the Member States could negotiate different provisions potentially regulating some aspects of the free movement of physicians in the EU. Currently, proposals to regulate physician movement, such as the Code, hold non-binding effect and rely on ethical constraint. The EU, however, has power to pass binding resolutions. As previously explained, the EU has shown a greater interest in addressing health care issues than in past decades and where it has allowed the free movement of physicians through Directive 96/13, and now Directive 2005/36, it should allow itself to place regulations on the negative effects this free movement may potentially cause. Ideally, the EU could solve the potential problem this Note identifies through issuing a Directive or set of Directives considering some of the solutions the Code and other academics have proposed. It could start gradually by requiring its Member States to respect the agreements other Member States make with the physicians they train. Then, it could implement greater measures requiring countries such as the UK to pay the training costs of the physicians it recruits. Another effective means by which the EU could gradually regulate physician migration would be through enacting temporary restrictions on the number of foreign physicians EU members may recruit, depending on the numbers of each home country's respective physician supply. 333 If the EU chose to take legislative action, the ECJ could also provide support. This is likely given its recent indications that it would allow the EU to provide more regulation of health care than the Members States currently provide. 3 4 It could uphold any regulations the EU implements to stymie adverse effects of physician flow in the EU. Alternatively, it could affirm a home country's implementation of one of the aforementioned policies to protect its physician supplies. Lastly, the EU could propose language in future treaties amongst EU countries that would promote policies helping resolve potential problems of disparate physician supplies among EU countries.
Following its gradual intervention to regulate the potentially adverse outcomes of EU law allowing for the free movement of physicians, this Note proposes the EU legislatively requires its countries to implement a system of data collection allowing researchers to monitor the level of actual migration and physician depletion in EU countries as well as to investigate which gradual interventions work to balance the physician working force in the EU. 335 Scholars have suggested researchers and/or countries engage in more "data analysis" to fulfill a "need for a more detailed assessment of the actual impact of health workers moving to other countries compared to that caused by health workers leaving the health sector in-country." 336 This would allow the EU to determine whether health workers are migrating in a considerable manner and in what way this affects EU countries.
These are all legal mechanisms and institutions the EU could utilize to ensure the effect of EU laws on physician migration, especially with the recent accession of new Member States, will not produce adverse outcomes in any of the Member States. Where the EU sought initially that every EU country benefit through the mutual recognition of qualifications and the free movement of physicians, it should also seek that every country benefit through protective measures limiting the adverse effects of its former proposals. A gradual method of intervention would address the arguments of those who are skeptical of EU laws allowing for physician movement without immediately jeopardizing 333 
